Files\\2011 Case Study\\CS1\_Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2011 National Military Strategy - § 1 reference coded [ 0.11% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.11% Coverage

The United States faces persistent, widespread, and growing threats from state and non-state actors in space and cyberspace

Files\\2015 Case Study\\CS2\_Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2015 White House Report on Cyber Deterrence Policy - § 1 reference coded [ 0.10% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.10% Coverage

the full spectrum of operational capabilities requires resources, persistence, and access to technological expertise

Files\\2018 Case Study\\CS3\_Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2018 DoD Cyber Strategy Summary - § 3 references coded [ 1.72% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.48% Coverage

These States have expanded that competition to include persistent campaigns in and through cyberspace that pose longterm strategic risk to the Nation as well as to our allies and partners.

Reference 2 - 0.46% Coverage

China is eroding U.S. military overmatch and the Nation’s economic vitality by persistently exfiltrating sensitive information from U.S. public and private sector institutions.

Reference 3 - 0.78% Coverage

Persistently contest malicious cyber activity in day-to-day competition: The Department will counter cyber campaigns threatening U.S. military advantage by defending forward to intercept and halt cyber threats and by strengthening the cybersecurity of systems and networks that support DoD missions.

Files\\2018 Case Study\\CS3\_Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2018 National Cyber Strategy - § 1 reference coded [ 0.08% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.08% Coverage

This now-persistent engagement in cyberspace is already altering the strategic balance of power.

Files\\2023 Case Study\\CS4\_Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2022 National Defense Strategy - § 10 references coded [ 0.58% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.06% Coverage

The Department will also campaign day-to-day to gain and sustain military advantages, counter acute forms of our competitors’ coercion, and complicate our competitors’ military preparations.1

Reference 2 - 0.04% Coverage

The Department will advance our priorities through integrated deterrence, campaigning, and actions that build enduring advantages.2

Reference 3 - 0.08% Coverage

Campaigning initiatives change the environment to the benefit of the United States and our Allies and partners, while limiting, frustrating, and disrupting competitor activities that seriously impinge on our interests, especially those carried out in the gray zone.3

Reference 4 - 0.06% Coverage

Campaigning requires discipline. It targets the most consequential competitor activities – those that, if left unaddressed, would endanger our military advantages and vital national interests now and in the future.

Reference 5 - 0.03% Coverage

Campaigning to Gain Military Advantage, Enhance Deterrence, and Address Gray Zone Challenges.

Reference 6 - 0.07% Coverage

Campaigning initiatives will improve our baseline understanding of the operating environment and seek to shape perceptions, including by sowing doubt in our competitors that they can achieve their objectives or conduct unattributed coercive actions.

Reference 7 - 0.08% Coverage

Nevertheless, there can be an important role for campaigning to disrupt competitors’ attempts to advance their objectives through gray zone tactics, especially when integrated for maximum impact with the actions of Allies, partners, and other U.S. departments and agencies.

Reference 8 - 0.04% Coverage

Campaigning initiatives will provide a range of options to oppose select, acute forms of coercion carried out by competitors.

Reference 9 - 0.08% Coverage

The Department will conduct campaigning activities from this posture against a clear set of objectives, to include deterring adversary attacks, supporting rapid crisis response with survivable forces, and conducting operations to reinforce internationally-agreed-upon norms.

Reference 10 - 0.05% Coverage

conduct campaigning activities that improve our position and reinforce deterrence while limiting or disrupting competitor activities that seriously affect U.S. interests.

Files\\2023 Case Study\\CS4\_Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2022 National Military Strategy - § 1 reference coded [ 0.85% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.85% Coverage

The NMS Theory of Success is to exercise Strategic Discipline to continuously calibrate Joint Force weight of effort between campaigning and rapidly building warfighting advantage to deter now and reduce future risk.4

Files\\2023 Case Study\\CS4\_Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2023 DoD Cyber Strategy Summary - § 4 references coded [ 1.11% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.30% Coverage

By persistently engaging malicious cyber actors and other malign threats to U.S. interests in cyberspace, U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) will support Department-wide campaigns to strengthen deterrence and gain advantages.

Reference 2 - 0.18% Coverage

2. Prepare to Fight and Win the Nation’s Wars. The Department will campaign in and through cyberspace to advance Joint Force objectives.

Reference 3 - 0.23% Coverage

The Department will continue to persistently engage U.S. adversaries in cyberspace, identifying malicious cyber activity in the early stages of planning and development.

Reference 4 - 0.41% Coverage

The Department will use cyberspace operations to enable and empower the Joint Force. These efforts will unfold in multiple ways: through persistent campaigning below the level of armed conflict5, through cyber defense and the fostering of cyber resilience, and through support of campaign and contingency planning.

Files\\2023 Case Study\\CS4\_Primary Sources\_Policy\_Strategies\\2023 National Cybersecurity Strategy - § 2 references coded [ 0.14% Coverage]

Reference 1 - 0.02% Coverage

(2) Disrupt and Dismantle Threat Actors

Reference 2 - 0.13% Coverage

Similarly, CISA enables persistent, multi-directional threat information sharing with the private sector through the JCDC and, in coordination with the FBI, uses that information to accelerate victim notification and to reduce the impact of identified intrusions.

**Annotations**

1 Campaigning as a form of persistence.

2 Campaigning as a type of persistence.

3 Campaigning as a form of persistence.

4 Campaigning as a form of Persistent Engagement.

5 First direct linkage between persistence and campaigning.